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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-3479 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MARK O. WHITE, 
               Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 4-12-cr-00322) 
District Judge: John E. Jones III 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 14, 2019 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, KRAUSE, and PORTER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 19, 2019) 
   
 
OPINION* 
   
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
Mark O. White appeals the District Court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion 
to vacate his sentence, arguing that his sentence was unconstitutional because, during 
plea bargaining, the Government leveraged the threat of a statutory sentencing 
enhancement that was subsequently abrogated-in-part as unconstitutional.  See Johnson v. 
United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015).  Because White waived his right to bring 
such a collateral challenge to his sentence when he entered his plea, and because 
enforcing that waiver does not “work a miscarriage of justice,” United States v. Khattak, 
273 F.3d 557, 563 (3d Cir. 2001), we will affirm. 
 Background 
White was caught with several guns in his apartment and pleaded guilty to 
unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  During 
plea negotiations, the Government purportedly “wielded the threat of the Armed Career 
Criminal [Act] (‘ACCA’) enhancement,” App. 52, which would have subjected White 
upon conviction to a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years, see 18 U.S.C. § 
924(e).  His fear of that prospect ostensibly impelled him to enter into a plea agreement 
with the Government in which both parties agreed, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), that the ten-year statutory maximum for a § 922(g) conviction 
was appropriate in his case, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), and the Government agreed to 
recommend that sentence to the District Court, which imposed it.   
Approximately two years later, the Supreme Court struck down the ACCA in part, 
concluding that the statute’s residual clause in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) violated the Due Process 
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Clause because it was too vague to provide fair notice of the conduct that it punished.  
Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557–60.  That change in law prompted White to file a motion to 
vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, asserting that the Government’s use of the 
ACCA as a bargaining chip to secure his guilty plea rendered his sentence 
unconstitutional.  The District Court denied the motion, concluding that Johnson did not 
affect his sentence because, although the ACCA may have played a role in plea 
negotiations, he was not actually sentenced under the ACCA.  This appeal followed. 
 Discussion1  
We will not disturb the District Court’s denial of relief because, as a condition of 
White’s plea agreement, he waived his right to “collateral review, including . . . a motion 
to vacate judgment under Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255,” App. 32, and the 
record here demonstrates that waiver was knowing, voluntary, and enforceable.     
A waiver of the right to collateral review is valid if it is “entered into knowingly 
and voluntarily and [its] enforcement does not work a miscarriage of justice.  United 
States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 237 (3d Cir. 2008), abrogated on other grounds by Garza 
v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738 (2019).  We have declined “to earmark specific situations” that 
constitute a “miscarriage of justice” and have instead endorsed several factors to consider 
on a case-by-case basis, including the “clarity” of the alleged “error.”  Khattak, 273 F.3d 
at 563 (quoting United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 25–26 (1st Cir. 2001)).   
                                              
1 The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  Having granted 
a certificate of appealability, we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a) and 
(c). 
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Here, White does not argue that he entered into the waiver unknowingly or 
involuntarily and focuses his briefing instead on his contention that its enforcement 
would work a miscarriage of justice.2  That argument is unavailing because the alleged 
“error”—the Government’s leveraging of the then-valid ACCA sentencing enhancement 
as a bargaining chip in plea negotiations—lacks the sort of “clarity,” Khattak, 273 F.3d at 
563 (citation omitted), that attends a miscarriage of justice.  Put differently, even if White 
had not knowingly and voluntarily agreed to forgo a collateral challenge to his sentence, 
that challenge would be dubious on the merits, and we will not set aside his waiver to 
consider a claim for relief that is both novel and suspect.  See id. at 562 (“A waiver of the 
right to appeal includes a waiver of the right to appeal difficult or debatable legal issues . 
. . .” (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Cabrera-Rivera, 893 F.3d 14, 30 (1st 
Cir. 2018) (acknowledging similarity between miscarriage-of-justice and plain-error 
standards).  
Generally, for a defendant who has not waived his direct appeal or collateral 
review rights, “a voluntary plea of guilty intelligently made in the light of the then 
applicable law does not become vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate that 
the plea rested on a faulty premise.”  United States v. Lockett, 406 F.3d 207, 213 (3d Cir. 
2005) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970)).  There is “only a 
                                              
2 White fleetingly states in his brief that “his guilty plea was not knowing or adequately 
informed because it was premised on the applicability of the . . . [now partially 
abrogated] ACCA.”  Appellant’s Reply Br. 1.  But he does not explain that bald 
assertion, and his brief goes on to argue only that the miscarriage-of-justice exception 
applies.   
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limited set of grounds . . . available for a defendant to challenge a conviction or sentence 
based on a guilty plea.”  United States v. Peppers, 899 F.3d 211, 225 (3d Cir. 2018).  For 
instance, Congress may create statutory mechanisms for defendants who plead guilty to 
later challenge a conviction or seek a sentence reduction in light of new legal 
developments.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (authorizing courts to reduce a sentence 
that was “based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the 
Sentencing Commission”); see also Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1773, 1775 
(2018).  As another example, a guilty plea will not preclude a defendant from collaterally 
attacking her conviction where, because of a change in law, it becomes clear that the 
defendant did not receive “real notice of the true nature of the charge against him” before 
pleading guilty.  Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618–19 (quoting Smith v. 
O’Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941)) (allowing collateral challenge where defendant 
pleaded guilty to violating a statute that was subsequently interpreted narrowly by the 
Supreme Court, such that the defendant allegedly “[mis]understood the essential elements 
of the crime with which he was charged” when he pleaded guilty).  In a similar vein, we 
recently held that a defendant who—unlike White—was actually sentenced under the 
ACCA before Johnson was decided is not precluded by a guilty plea from collaterally 
attacking his sentence.  See Peppers, 899 F.3d at 225–26.  As we explained, “[p]arties 
may not stipulate to an unlawful sentence in a plea agreement.”  Id. at 225.    
But none of those exceptional circumstances pertain here.  The first two are 
inapplicable and, as to the third, White did not stipulate to an unlawful sentence.  Just the 
opposite:  White’s original indictment charged him with a violation of § 924(e), but the 
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unlawful ACCA enhancement was specifically bargained out of his guilty plea.  We have 
never recognized the availability of collateral review in a case like this, i.e., where a law 
later declared unconstitutional merely contributed to the Government’s negotiating 
leverage in plea bargaining.  In fact, the notion of such relief is in sharp tension with our 
precedent, under which “[t]he possibility of a favorable change in the law occurring after 
a plea agreement” is ordinarily viewed as “merely one of the risks that accompanies a 
guilty plea.”  Lockett, 406 F.3d at 214; see also Brady, 397 U.S. at 757 (“A defendant is 
not entitled to withdraw his plea merely because he discovers long after the plea has been 
accepted that his calculus misapprehended . . . the likely penalties attached to alternative 
courses of action.”).  Thus, to the extent there is even the possibility that White would be 
entitled to relief if he had not waived his right to collateral review, that possibility is faint 
at best.  Accordingly, there is no miscarriage of justice in enforcing White’s waiver, see 
Khattak, 273 F.3d at 562, and we will do so. 
 Conclusion 
For the aforementioned reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
